The most recent balance-of-payments crisis in the Philippines, which began in August 1983, has plunged the country into a prolonged period of falling incomes and spending cutbacks. In 1984 the country experienced its first decline in gross national product (GNP) of 5.5 per cent. This was followed by another 3.8 per cent decline in 1985. Because population is growing annually by at least 2.4 per cent, this has meant the per capita income has fallen by at least 15 per cent since 1983. The best that the economy can manage in 1986 is a growth rate of 1.5 per cent, although a year of zero growth is more likely.
Unless it succeeds in lowering the first priority that has been assigned to the servicing of its foreign debt, the country can grow at best by 4 per cent per year for the rest of the decade. This would imply that for the decade of the 1980s the country would have suffered a per capita decline of at least 10 per cent. Such a decline can only have disastrous consequences for the country's low-income groups, who must eke out a living within an economy whose income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient (an index which ranges from 0 to 1 as inequality increases), has been estimated to range between 0.5 and 0.6.
The assignment of first priority to debt servicing has meant that the adjustment strategy has been directed toward rapid improvement in the current account. For the Marcos government, overthrown in February 1986, such an adjustment strategy implied implementing and adhering closely to a monetarist adjustment programme inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMP). In the case of the Philippines, such a programme was effective in the sense that it permitted the country eventually to achieve a current account surplus in 1985, which has meant that the country has serviced its foreign debt. It has also imposed hardships on those who could least afford to bear them. Such hardships can only be interpreted to have played a large part in the formation of broad resistance to the Marcos regime.
The new Aquino government inherited an economy in shambles. It is even more important at this time to understand the nature of the crisis and the nature of the adjustment policies that were previously inflicted on the economy. This paper attempts to clarify these issues. On the basis of the limited data available, I also discuss the effects of the crisis and the adjustment programmes on the population. At this point, these effects on lowincome groups are known mostly in a qualitative sense, and I make the plea that future research effort should be directed at identifying the channels of these effects and quantifying their size. This should provide the means by which adjustment programmes can be better designed to reduce their harmful impact on employment, food consumption, and nutritional status.
NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE CRISIS
In the past decade the Philippines had to weather a number of adverse exogenous developments: the oil price increases of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 , sharp deterioration in the terms of trade (see table 1), the international recession in 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, and the associated drop in the demand for Philippine exports. These developments led to persistent currentaccount deficits, which were financed through foreign borrowings.
The response to external shocks through foreign borrowings brought unpleasant consequences as the country's external debt grew at an annual rate of 25 per cent over the period 1970-1981. The Philippines' own cumulative current-account deficit for the period 1970-1982 was US$12.9 billion, and by 1983 the total external debt reached US$24.6 billion. The foreign financing of the deficit was encouraged by low interest-rate charges during the period 1974-1978. When the international credit market tightened in 1979, however, the country continued to borrow at higher real rates and increasingly shorter terms. In addition, amortization of previous debt became increasingly burdensome as interest rates rose Manuel F. Montes School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines and loans fell due. By 1982, net interest expense came close to US$2 billion and was responsible for 46 per cent of the current-account deficit.
While it appears that external factors were responsible for the economic crisis, a closer examination shows that domestic policy variables and the longstanding structural problems of the economy were the main causes of the country's inability to service its foreign obligations and the accompanying disruption in trade transactions [2] .
Apparently, the strategy was to cushion the impact of external developments through foreign borrowings {instead of immediately carrying out an adjustment) without having to sacrifice income growth targets. During the past decade, the government engaged in a programme of infrastructure projects and investments that had long payback periods. A significant amount of government capital expenditures contributed insignificantly to the supply of goods and services. While they created demand, especially as they involved construction, they produced little output. This led to inflationary pressures quite apart from those contributed by external shocks.
To sustain this aggressive pattern of spending, the government adopted generally expansionist fiscal and monetary policies. The heavy spending increased government deficits that could not be covered by domestic savings. The gap between investment and savings widened from P1.9 billion annually in 1971-1975 (2.4 per cent of GNP) to P9.1 billion annually in 1976-1980 (4.8 per cent of GNP). The gap had to be made up by foreign borrowings, which rose from US$2.6 billion to US$10.5 billion between 1975 and 1980. The allocation of government resources to low productivity uses led to a dismal performance of the economy as compared to that of its Asian neighbours. The process of growth through government deficits can be sustained without huge increases in foreign indebtedness only if the expenditures are validated by increasing productivity per worker. Higher savings made possible by higher productivity could then offset the effects of the budget deficit on the balance of payments. The inefficiency of the investment strategy took a turn for the worse when, in 1981-1983, government equity investments became the single most important capital outlay, exceeding the share of infrastructure. This occurred when the government was constrained to bail out near-bankrupt private firms that had borrowed from government financial institutions. Non-financial public corporations themselves were recipients of equity contributions because of the large deficits in their operations. The proliferation of new government corporations and various bureaucracies as well as state banks reflected the increasing role of the government in the market for products and financial assets. The extent of government activity in financial markets can be readily discerned as one notes that four government financial institutions (the Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Philippine Veterans Bank) account for close to half of the total assets of the commercial banking system. The government's increased economic role has not been accompanied by any social levelling, nor has it improved the lot of the poorest in society.
As was mentioned earlier, the Philippines suffered from major exogenous shocks emanating from a volatile international economic environment. While external difficulties were a necessary condition for the crisis, the continuous weakening of the economy through the years can be attributed to the unproductive investment strategy described above. Although other developing countries faced the same external shocks, they did not encounter the difficulties that the Philippines is experiencing at present. The crisis was long in the making. It was apparent that there was a downward drift in the country's economic performance. In 1981, real GNP grew by 3.7 per cent. In the next two years, GNP growth averaged less than 2 per cent (table 2) [3] .
At this point, any major exogenous disturbance was bound to provoke a crisis. The assassination of Senator Aquino in August 1983 did just that. Immediately after the assassination, foreign financing halted abruptly. Without replenishment from short-term borrowings, international reserves fell from US$2.4 billion to US$0.7 billion in two months. The situation was exacerbated by the flight of capital, as residents as well as foreigners speculated on future political conditions.
In October 1983 the peso was devalued from P11 to P14 to the dollar. The devaluation triggered inflationary expectations that further raised prices and encouraged hoarding and further speculation. In October 1984 the inflation rate reached a peak of 64 per cent. Reserve requirements were raised to reduce money-supply growth. Budget cuts for the succeeding years were also announced. Foreign-exchange cut off the flow of imported material inputs to many industries. This, in turn, caused numerous firms to cut back, lay off workers, or simply close shop.
Simultaneously with these events, the Philippines began negotiations with the IMF and its private creditor banks. In the course of the negotiations the country religiously fulfilled its prior action commitments to the IMF, which included a reduction of reserve money in the first quarter of 1984. By the time an agreement was concluded in December 1984, the IMF could state that the country had made substantial progress toward adjustment as that agency conceives the meaning of "adjustment. ''
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS ON LOW-INCOME GROUPS
The effect of the crisis on the social and material welfare of the people is difficult to document. From the limited data available, only intuitive assessments of the situation can be made regarding the relationship between trends of social indicators and the macroeconomic events. It must also be pointed out that the Philippines managed to postpone adjustment in the 1970s. Nevertheless, even the long-term trends did not exhibit a favourable pattern before the 1983 crisis.
Several unfavourable trends affecting living conditions in the Philippines can be observed over the past few years. Real wages for skilled and unskilled labourers as well as in the agricultural sector were on a generally declining trend during the period 1970-1982 (tables 3 and 4). A legislated minimum wage (which was in fact higher than the reported wage) in conjunction with inflation partly explains this trend. Real wages increased only for a short while during 1975-1978 because of relatively low inflation and high investment growth rates. Deterioration of the economic environment, slack labour demand, and the surge in inflation in the succeeding years led to erosion of real wages. For the period 1971-1982, the labour force grew at an average annual rate of 3.6 per cent. This was due largely to the rapid growth of the working-age population and increased participation of females in the labour force. These trends placed downward pressure on real wages (on top of the inflation rate) and contributed to the growing levels of underemployment.
As in other developing countries, the unemployment rate is a poor indicator of the population's well-being. In fact, during the quarter immediately after the then emerging crisis {fourth quarter of 1983), the lowest unemployment rate of 4.1 per cent was recorded. This perhaps indicates the need for relatively more people to work and to help families to cope with the crisis. As can be seen from table 5, no visible trend could be discerned from the movements of the unemployment rate. The lack of employment opportunities is better manifested by the lack of full-time work, when, in fact, persons would like to do more work or when those with full-time work want more work to augment their income. In the same table, the highest underemployment rate of 30.5 per cent was experienced during the fourth quarter of 1983, the quarter immediately after the Aquino assassination. The data also show the increase in the percentage of the visibly and invisibly underemployed through the years.
The trend in income inequality is also disconcerting. Data on quintile shares for 1971 and 1980-1983 (table   6) show that the income share of the top 20 per cent increased from 53 per cent in 1971 to 59 per cent in the third quarter of 1983. On the other hand, the shares of the bottom four quintiles declined. Positive economic growth rates in between the periods did not in any way help to reduce this degree of income inequality. In 1984, when the economy experienced a high inflation rate and a negative growth rate, it can probably be said that, at best, the situation did not change.
Various studies by international organizations, individual researchers, and government agencies using different nutritional norms have come up with different poverty lines. All studies are in agreement, however, as to the high frequency of poverty in the Philippines. The prevalence of poverty and problems of malnutrition are inextricably intertwined. The latter can be attributed to food demand and supply conditions. Despite various government programmes (e.g., Masagana 99) and extensive research on high-yielding crop varieties, the Philippines has yet to achieve self-sufficiency in food supply. Modest growth in agricultural production in the past decade failed to keep up with the rapid population growth. Intermittent fluctuations in supply due to weather disturbances led to unwanted movements in food prices and encouraged hoarding. Stabilization of food prices through imports and stockpiling were the measures used to protect low-income consumers at the expense of food producers who receive lower incomes. The objective of keeping food prices down is achieved with the help of an overvalued exchange rate; however, overvaluation lowers incentives for agricultural production, which, in turns, reduces demand for unskilled labour. Computed by straightforward interpolation of cumulative family income distributions.
On the demand side, there is no doubt that income disparities lead to differing food expenditure patterns. World Bank 1983 data on household expenditures in Metro Manila, with the households classified according to their per capita expenditure (table 7) , reveal high percentages spent on food in the lower per capita expenditure classes. In addition, the average household size decreases, the higher the expenditure class. It is clear that the poor, with larger household size, spend a greater proportion of their money for food than the non-poor.
Malnutrition can be attributed to the unequal distribution of nutrients across groups in society as well as within the household unit [5] . Table 8 shows the percentage adequacy of energy and protein intake for the Philippines as a whole as 88.6 and 102.9 per cent respectively. These figures taken alone are misleading, however. The same table reveals the variation in nutrient intakes according to income groups, rural or urban residence, and section of the country. Intake levels and therefore the adequacy percentages for all nutrients are high for higher-income groups. Furthermore, the nutritional status in urban areas is slightly better than in the rural areas.
Intrafamilial nutrient distribution data from a study of 100 households in the Metro Manila area in 1980 by Florencio and Aligaen [6] show that household heads had the highest diet rating in both rural and urban areas. Fathers and male off spring had more nutritionally adequate diets than female household members. Preschoolers had the best nutrient intake among offspring, while adolescents had the poorest. Given the limited data, the nutritionally at-risk groups could hardly be identified. What is clear, though is that the nutritional status of low-income groups should be examined and intra-household nutrient distribution be given due attention.
MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
The Philippines has had 18 stand-by credit arrangements with the IMF since 1962. The eighth arrangement, in 1970, was spawned by the third balance-of-payments (BOP) crisis, which erupted that year. The poor performance of the foreign trade sector and the monetary and fiscal policies prior to 1970 led to growing current-account deficits. The 1969 presidential elections accelerated government spending and delivered the final blow as the money supply increased by 20 per cent. In line with the conditions of the eighth arrangement, the peso was devalued by 39 per cent, from P3.90 to P6.40 per US dollar, in February 1970 and the reserve requirement was raised 2 per cent by May 1970. The stringent conditions that accompanied the arrangement resulted in the reduction of the current-account deficit by 75 per cent, a BOP surplus, and a 4 per cent increase in GNP [7] .
The modest success of the eighth arrangement led to the ninth, tenth, and eleventh programmes, for the period 19711973, when total external debt grew at an average annual rate of 7 per cent. Credit grew modestly in 1971 and 1972, at 11.2 per cent and 11.6 per cent respectively. In 1973 the money supply target was missed by a wide margin as the government failed to stop the rapid expansion of liquidity due to the commodity price boom.
Surprisingly, the twelfth stand-by programme, in 1974, called for a 42.5 per cent increase in money supply, one-third higher than the previous year's growth. In this programme, BOP imbalances due to the oil shock were to be met by increases in the level of medium-and long-term borrowings and not through devaluation of the overvalued peso. The programme targets were for the most part not met. The inflation rate reached 33 per cent and the trade deficit widened. It was in this period that short-term capital inflows began to circumvent the debt ceiling that existed only for medium-and longterm debt. The weak performance of the Philippine economy and the pattern of light conditionality that began in the ninth arrangement continued under the thirteenth arrangement in 1975. By 1976 the BOP was in a precarious situation.
The chronic balance-of-payments difficulties forced the government to request an extended fund facility (EFF) from the IMF. The EFF was a medium-term arrangement (1976) (1977) (1978) under which the IMF not only set fiscal and monetary targets but also outlined performance criteria for structural adjustment as part of the conditions for a loan. The EFF structural adjustment programme had three important subprogrammes: tax reform to promote increased domestic savings so as to lessen dependence on capital inflows, a large public investment programme to improve infrastructure and to reduce energy dependence, and major tariff reform to improve resource allocation.
The ambitious targets in all the three sub-programmes of reform and investment were missed by a wide margin. The failure of the structural adjustment programme was partly due to the difficulties experienced by the government in implementing the agreed-upon changes in the incentive structure, that is, tariff reform. In the public investment programme, the projects undertaken had long gestation periods and required large amounts of resources. The failure of tax reform had the government turning to short-term loans (which up to this period were unmonitored) to finance public investments. By 1978 the Philippines exceeded the debt limit by 33 per cent.
The sixteenth arrangement, in 1980-1981, which was engendered by the second oil shock and the international recession, called for monetary restraint, limited domestic credits to the public sector, set a ceiling on the international reserve level of the banking system, and imposed a limit on foreign borrowings with 1 to 12 years' maturity. Up to this time, the IMF had not realized the flaw in the debt limit. As in previous agreements, all performance criteria in this programme were not met. In this period, the responsibility of managing structural adjustment programmes was shifted to the World Bank, while the IMF concentrated on short-term stabilization.
The first structural adjustment loan from the World Bank, in 1981, contained measures to bring about trade liberalization and industrial reform.
Several difficulties were encountered, however, when tariff reforms were delayed when the government attempted to increase revenues through additional import duties.
The country did not have an arrangement with the IMF in 1982. In that year, the budget deficit increased rapidly because of the government's attempt to bail out failing corporations. For the same reason, a substantial portion of the budget went to government corporations as equity contributions. Given a weak revenue system and the enormous increase in government expenditures, the government had to resort to foreign borrowings to finance the deficit, half of which were short-term loans.
By 1983 it became apparent that the Philippine economy was near the edge of a cliff. It was clear that the country was borrowing at unsustainable levels. The seventeenth stand-by programme, which became effective in February 1983, aimed at reducing the BOP deficit by one-half from that of the previous year. This was to be achieved by limiting the growth of net domestic assets of the monetary sector, slowing down government loans to public corporations, and setting a ceiling on foreign borrowings, including a subceiling on shortterm non-monetary debt. By the middle of the year, the BOP deficit and money supply had surpassed their targeted limits. Reluctantly, the government allowed the peso to adjust a little bit to relax the BOP pressure and curtail money growth. The IMF deemed this action too late and too little, and for the first time it terminated a programme with the Philippines. Two months after the beginning of the fourth crisis, in August 1983, the peso was devalued by 21.4 per cent.
Negotiations for the eighteenth stand-by arrangement started upon the onset of the fourth crisis during the last quarter of 1983. An arrangement between the Philippines and the IMF was not reached until December 1984. In the interim, the Philippines had to keep a ceiling on money growth and had to devalue successively to lighten the pressure on the economy. The protracted negotiations indicated that the IMF had reverted to its strict monetarist prescriptions in its dealings with the Philippines.
CONSEQUENCES OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES FOR THE POOR
The overshooting of money-supply targets set by the IMF before the 1983 crisis was due largely to the budget deficits incurred by the government. During the period 19701980, the money supply was permitted to grow at 17 per cent annually, compared to 4.4 per cent and 10 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s respectively. The departure from conservative monetary and fiscal policies of the earlier periods contributed to high inflation rates and partly explains the declining trend in real wages. Between 1970 and 1980 the nominal exchange rate fell by less than 2 per cent. Thus, nominal adjustment of the peso value does not fully compensate for the fact that domestic inflation was higher than in the rest of the world during the 1970s.
During the second half of the 1960s the average annual inflation rate based on the consumer price index was 6 per cent, while in the first half of the 1970s it was 16 per cent. With the oil shock in 1979 and 1980, the inflation rate was 17.5 and 18.2 per cent respectively. Thereafter it declined, reaching 10 per cent in 1983.
The 21 per cent devaluation of the peso in the last quarter of 1983 triggered a 26.1 per cent jump in the general price level. In 1984 the inflation rate averaged 50.3 per cent. The sustained tight money policy reduced the average inflation rate to 25.0 per cent by November 1985. To mop up excess liquidity, the Central Bank engaged in open market operations that drove interest rates to excessively high levels. This and the limited flow of imported inputs generated supply shocks that forced firms to lay off workers. By December 1985 the inflation rate had fallen to 5.7 per cent. Table 9 shows the number of workers terminated quarterly from 1983 through the first half of 1985. After the October 1983 devaluation, the number of laid-off workers increased rapidly, so that the fourth-quarter total accounted for more than half of the 1983 total. Successive devaluations and the stringent monetary policy in 1984 also brought abnormally high levels of layoffs. This continued up to the first quarter of 1985.
The adjustment policies that were designed to place the economy in a reasonable growth path had not in any way alleviated the status of the poor. While the Philippines indeed showed positive real growth rates in the past decade, the distribution of output on the average changed negligibly. The agriculture sector, which provided more than 50 per cent of all employment throughout the 1970s, accounts for roughly one-fourth of gross domestic product on the average. A World Bank report on poverty trends determined that poverty rates in rural areas are higher than in urban areas. In the former, poverty in 1983 was 43 per cent, while it was 19 per cent in the latter.
The monopolistic structures that emerged during the decade were encouraged by a strong industrialization bias of previous development strategies and were simply reinforced by the adjustment policies implemented. Because of the emphasis on import-dependent industrialization, traditional agriculture remained relatively stagnant, although the non-agricultural sectors were heavily dependent on it for foreign exchange. The agriculture sector in recent years underwent a structural evolution in which a dichotomy arose because of the monopolization of the agricultural export industries by the government. In this set-up, an export subsector existed side by side with a lagging food sector.
The instability of the Philippine food sector led the government to intervene in the food market through the National Food Authority whenever it deemed it necessary. Where there is a chronic deficiency in food supply that leads to food-price increases, the Authority attempts to stabilize prices through food imports.
In the past decade, the government's resources were largely devoted to investment projects. The government priorities through the years can be discerned from the sectoral allocation of government expenditures. The share of social services declined substantially, from 44.2 per cent in 1965 to 34.9 per cent in 1970. Thereafter, it accounted for less than 25 per cent of the total budget. On the other hand, the allocation to economic services (infrastructure and non-infrastructure expenditures) was increasing. In 1982 its share was 42.4 per cent.
One-third of total government expenditures in 1982 went to general public services.
Real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. On a per capita basis, however, a declining trend could be discerned in the 1980s (table 10). In the second half of 1983, when the crisis began, real PCE per capita declined by 0.15 per cent from its level for the same period in the previous year. The decline became more pronounced in the first half of 1984, and in the following six months real PCE per capita decreased by 1.36 per cent from the previous year's level.
Adjustment policies are designed to provide longterm solutions to macroeconomic problems posed by a BOP crisis. The distributional impact, if it is not altogether assumed away in the process of formulating policies, is seldom given consideration.
The short-run effects of these policies in the form of high domestic inflation rates and decreasing per capita real incomes make worse an income distribution that is already skewed because of the structural defects of the economy. Clearly, if adjustment policies are designed to minimize the effects on the domestic economy, the burden of "adjustment" will be more equitably distributed. An alternative, given that adjustment policies are formulated in a certain manner, is to design auxiliary policies consistent with them that will meet the needs of the poor.
A survey carried out by the National Nutrition Council provides some preliminary but nevertheless worrisome indications of the effect of the crisis on preschool children. The survey measured weight-forheight status for all regions in the Philippines in 1984 and 1985. For the whole country, the percentage of preschoolers falling below 85 per cent of the weightfor-height standard increased from 13.3 to 14.3. An examination of the reginal results shows that the western Visayas, principally Negros and lloilo Province, which grow sugar for export, exhibited an increase from 13.8 to 20.1 per cent in the proportion of preschoolers falling below 85 per cent of the standard weight for height. Even the most urbanized region, metropolitan Manila, had an increase from 8.8 to 14.4 per cent. The differences in the degree of deterioration and the fact that some regions exhibited improvements between 1984 and 1985 is evidence that these changes can be attributed to a large degree to the difficult external adjustments. The depressed world prices of sugar caused visible starvation in Negros, while metropolitan Manila has seen many of its import dependent manufacturing operations shut down. In the kind of adjustment that has so far been carried out, sugar and factory workers have found themselves with greatly diminished means of providing for their livelihood.
SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
An analysis of the short-run impact of macroeconomic adjustment policies on the poor is quite intricate, since it may be necessary to classify the economy by sectors and income groups for this purpose. Difficulties could arise because distributional and price interactions among sectors brought about by exogenous disturbances are complex.
Intersectoral complications are by no means the same for all developing countries. Thus, an intersectoral model that lends itself well to empirical verification in a particular country may not be suitable for another country. Interactions among sectors are likely to be the product of the history of economic policies, which, given initial resource endowments, shape the structure of the economy. For this reason research in this area can appropriately begin with an examination of the structure of the particular economy. A unique set of structural constraints and current policies will govern each country's evolution.
It would be a fair statement to say that stabilization programmes in the Philippines have been designed and implemented with a limited regard for their effects on the country's human population. This limitation can be traced to two factors. First, the existing information base about the relationship between macroeconomic adjustments and microeconomic adjustments is small. Some data are available from the surveys that have been conducted by the census office, but these have not been processed in such form that their macroeconomic implications can be analysed. Moreover, the processing of cross-sectional data itself has been problematic in the decade as resources for this purposes have been constricted. In the past decade there was a presumption, now increasingly being called into question, that economic growth at the macro level automatically addresses many of the problems of nutrition and poverty.
The second reason for this limited regard for effects of stabilization programmes on the human population is that the modelling efforts of both international agencies (such as the IMP) and local researchers have not found the connection crucial until the onset of the 1983 crisis. The experience of previous programmes did not involve absolute declines in total real output. The present crisis, however, has seen absolute declines in an economy with a heavily skewed income distribution, and the deep effects on the poor cannot be ignored.
While adjustment programmes are not explicitly meant to impose the greater burden on the poor, actual experience has been that redistribution against the poor is implicit in stabilization programmes. The mechanism through which the effects of policies on distribution are transmitted is, therefore, important and must be identified for a given economic structure. This being the case, a more articulated macroeconomic model that explicitly takes into account income groups should be used and the relationships of important aggregates be spelt out.
The theoretical specification that may require incorporating microeconomic concepts within a macro framework can be translated in an empirical computable model. The extensive use of data found in social-accounting matrices (a 1978 table exists for the Philippines) and microeconomic demand and supply equations seem to be called for. This would be the only way to evaluate the impact of macroeconomic policies on groups in society, especially those already being left behind in, or, perhaps, by, the development process.
